Communication Predictors and Social Influence in Crisis Negotiations[1]

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Abstract

Influence tactics are tangible messages that may be used to influence the way in which a crisis negotiation unfolds over time. We begin this chapter by placing influence tactics and their use in the broader context of negotiation research and practice. Drawing on contemporary research, we then unpack the role of influence by introducing the Table of Ten, a theoretical classification of influence tactics that distinguishes between relational and content orientated messages. We show how this collection of message tactics may be used to shape a developing negotiation, and consider how research into the Table of Ten has provided insights into the dynamics of interaction across cultures, time periods, and types of crises. We conclude with discussing the use of the Table of Ten in practice.

Communication Predictors and Social Influence in Crisis Negotiations

An observation often made by police officers during their crisis negotiation training is that experienced negotiators have a natural style of interacting that is engaging, reassuring, and difficult to respond to with anger or violence. To the novice, these negotiators are talented in their ability to build rapport, create an atmosphere conducive to cooperation, and present unwelcome messages in a way that minimizes their negative connotations. In part, these abilities are the result of the experienced negotiator's use of techniques such as active

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listening skills (Rogan, Donohue, & Lyles, 1990; Taylor & Donohue, 2006) and conceptual models such as those that encourage a negotiator to consider emotional, relational, and substantive aspects of the negotiation (Rogan & Hammer, 2002; Taylor, 2002a). However, they are also the result of the negotiator's knowledge about how to present messages in a way that appeals to, and persuades the perpetrator. For example, a police negotiator's suggestion to release an elderly hostage is often more effective when it is preceded by conversation about the perpetrators considerate nature and wish not to harm the hostages. Experienced negotiators have learned that messages presented using known persuasive devices—particular phrases or sequences of arguments—can make them more conducive to compliance or cooperation than would otherwise be the case.

The use of persuasive messages, known in the negotiation literature as influence tactics, is the focus of this chapter. We define the use of influence tactics as deliberate actions by one individual (e.g., police negotiator) directed at another individual (e.g., perpetrator) that seek to alter the attitudes and/or behaviors of the target in a way that would not have otherwise occurred (cf. Gass & Seiter, 1999). We begin the chapter by mapping out the important role of influence tactics in contemporary crisis negotiation research and practice. We then present a theoretically-derived set of ten influence tactics and discuss how and when these tactics can influence the progress of negotiation. We end by outlining how the effectiveness of influence tactics can differ across cultures and negotiation contexts, and provide some guidelines for negotiators wishing to identify when their messages are having an influence.

Understanding Negotiation

In reflecting on what we know about negotiation, it can be useful to divide our understanding into two levels. One level of understanding is focused on the interpersonal factors that fuel crisis negotiation and how changes in these factors allow an interaction to begin, unfold and resolve. The need to develop affiliation, reduce crisis intensity, and respond to the perpetrator's "face" issues, are among the factors that have been shown to play a role in the progress of negotiation (Donohue & Roberto, 1993; Giebels & Noelanders, 2004; Rogan & Hammer, 1994; Taylor, 2002a) and its success (Taylor, 2002b). These factors provide a framework from which a negotiator can begin to understand the issues that drive a crisis negotiation as a whole. By considering these factors, a negotiator is able to construct informed answers to questions such as "what is it I am trying to achieve?", "what factors are making this individual behave this way?", and "how should I approach this interaction to gain trust?" This type of understanding is thus orientated towards enhancing strategic decisions.

The second level of understanding centers on the cues and responses that underlie and give rise to the patterns found at the strategic level (Giebels & Noelanders, 2004; Taylor & Donald, 2003; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese, 1999). The focus here is toward the interconnections among messages, the responses typically elicited by certain cues, and the way in which these cue-response sequences build to move a negotiation down a particular path. For example, messages that draw on rational persuasion and logic are often effective when presented to a Dutch perpetrator, but they can have a very different effect when presented to a perpetrator who was brought up in a collectivist culture such as China. Understanding such cue-response patterns may be thought of as bottom-up or focused on the building blocks of negotiation. An understanding at this level allows negotiators to respond to messages in ways that have been found to increase persuasion, and as such this knowledge may be seen as orientated toward tactical decisions about how to achieve strategic objectives.

The topic of influence tactics fits principally in the second level of understanding. For example, negotiators who want to address the issue of hostage safety may try to elicit a desired response by promising something in return, by referring to their loved ones and their distress, or by warning them of the consequences of not treating the hostage well. These three messages incorporate different types of influence, but each is aimed at achieving the higher level strategic goal of obtaining information and placing the focus of interaction onto the hostages. Thus, strategic goals may be translated into different influence tactics at a micro level. Tactics are message tools that can be applied at particular times to achieve higher level (sub-) goals of negotiation.

Messages with Influence

A first step in understanding how messages may be designed to influence a perpetrator is to understand the different forms of influence that are available. In the existing literature, three lines of research stand out as relevant to a categorization of influence. The most significant work has been done by experimental social psychologist Robert Cialdini (for a recent discussion, see Cialdini, 2001). Cialdini identifies a number of tactics based on six psychological mechanisms, each of which has been verified through controlled experimental studies. For example, Cialdini showed that people are more likely to take a particular course of action when they believe that others are doing, or would do, the same thing, something he referred to as the principle of social proof. A second area of work stems from communication theory, where researchers have considered influence at the dyadic level, often under the term "compliance-gaining". For example, in their review of compliance-gaining research, Kellerman and Cole (1994) show that demonstrating some authority on a subject is a good way of encouraging an individual to take your word for it. Finally, organizational psychologists have conducted some research into the effectiveness of different influence tactics on workforce behavior. For example, Higgins, Judge, and Ferris (2003) focus on the relative occurrence and effectiveness of different managerial influence styles in work situations. They find that one effective methods of influencing others to work is for the manager to rationalize or rationally persuade the other as to why a particular piece of work is worthwhile.

The Table of Ten

The three fields of research described above propose a range of different influence tactics. Some distinguish as few as 6 types of influence, while others distinguish as many as 20 different tactics. Some of these tactics, such as rational persuasion, exerting pressure, and legitimizing, have clear exemplar in the dialogue of crisis negotiations. Others, such as consulting or inspiring, are arguably less applicable to the crisis negotiation context. To determine which influence tactics are most applicable, the first author recently conducted a series of studies involving both interviews with Dutch and Belgian police negotiators and observations of their negotiation behavior in practice (see Giebels & Noelanders, 2004, for details). These analyses suggest that a set of ten categories of influence behavior are most applicable to crisis negotiation. These tactics, known as the "Table of Ten" (Giebels, 2002), are outlined in this section.

Table 1 summarizes the ten influence tactics together with the principles of influence on which they are based. To unpack the tactics presented in Table 1, it is useful to distinguish between tactics that are primarily connected with the sender and his or her relationship with the other party (relational tactics), and tactics that are primarily connected with the content of the message and the information conveyed to the other party (content tactics).[2] Importantly, this distinction brings to light a fundamental tension that exists in crisis negotiations. On the one hand, police negotiators must work hard to reduce the emotionality of the crisis, which they achieve through empathic, uncritical messages that are supportive of the perpetrator's concerns about issues such as personal safety and self worth. On the other hand, however,

[2] Most of the tactics shown in Table 1 may be placed within the five broad categories of conflict behavior and negotiation (i.e., forcing, yielding, compromising, avoiding and problem solving) found within the conflict management literature (e.g., Van de Vliert, 1997; Rubin & Kim, 2004).

there is a need for police negotiators to acknowledge the inappropriate actions of the perpetrator and work towards a realistic, substantive resolution. This side of negotiation is inherently less empathic and more focused on content, with negotiators often unable to conciliate to the perpetrator's demands and compelled to disagree over the form of a resolution. As Taylor and Donohue (2006) note, police negotiators are required to handle the complexity of expanding the "emotional pie" as well as expanding the traditional "substantive pie." The tactics outlined in Table 1 help negotiators achieve both of these objectives.

INSERT TABLE ONE HERE

Relational Tactics

Three influence tactics within the Table of Ten may be considered relational orientated in their focus. These relational oriented tactics have in common that they have more to do with the sender and his or her relationship with the other person than with the substantive content of the message. The first tactic, *Being kind*, refers to a message that presents a willingness to listen to someone and have sympathy for their situation. It is based on the psychological principle that people are more open to, and let themselves be influenced by, people that they like (Karras, 1974). The second tactic, *Being equal*, is based on the well-established principle that the sender of a message has a bigger chance of influencing behavior when the receiver perceives the sender as similar to them in their attitude, background or viewpoint (Perloff, 1993). This perceived similarity may come from messages that share a common experience, create a mutual external enemy, or emphasize mutual interdependence (Giebels, 2002; McMains & Mullins, 2001). The impact of this inferred common understanding is to increase the perceived similarity and, consequently, the influence that is gained by the message (Byrne, 1971). Finally, the third tactic, *Being credible*, refers to instances in which the sender indicates to the other party that they have the position and the capacity to handle a situation, and that they can be trusted. The credibility of a message source is arguably one of the oldest known methods of social influence. Aristotle, for example, refers to this method as “ethos” in his classical work “Rhetoric” (Aristotle, trans 1954). According to Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953), credibility consists of two components, namely expertise and reliability. A negotiator that conveys both of these facets of credibility typically increases the influence of his or her message.

Content Tactics

The remaining seven influence tactics of the Table of Ten are geared toward framing the content of the message. By using the tactic *Emotional appeal*, negotiators present messages that play on the other party’s personal feelings, values, ideals and self-image. In ”Rhetoric”, Aristotle refers to this as “pathos” (Aristotle, trans 1954). A negotiator’s messages may appeal to the other’s sense of humanity, refer to the positive feeling that the right choice may bring about, or point to the respect that will be gained by choosing the right solution. In contrast, the tactic *Intimidation* involves presenting messages that utilizes the power to impose punishments if the request or demand is not met (French & Raven, 1959). This tactic emerges in a range of strongly compelling messages, such as warnings, threats and personal attacks.

The tactic *Imposing a restriction* is based on the “scarcity principle”. According to this principle, people perceive commodities or possibilities as more valuable when they are difficult to obtain, or when their availability is likely to be short-lived (Cialdini, 1984). Tactics that impose a restriction include the postponement of certain concessions, but also the association of a time-limit or deadline to an offer. The tactic *Direct pressure* refers to direct efforts to persuade or compel the other party to act. These are often repeated so that the other gets used to the idea, and they are presented with reference to reasons as to why the other person should act. Messages that repeatedly issue a demand, or deliberately attempts to direct discussions towards an important issue, both fall into this tactic category. The tactic *Legitimizing* is an indirect form of influencing, in which the negotiator refers to external actors, events or issues to illustrate the request as appropriate or common to what others do. To accomplish this, a negotiator may refer to existing rules, laws or procedures, or they may refer to what an influential person (e.g., a religious leader, respected member of the perpetrator's family) thinks about the issue at hand.

The tactic *Exchanging* is based on the "principle of reciprocity" (Cialdini, 2001), the observation that people often feel obliged to respond to a gesture of giving (e.g., compliment, gift) by giving something in return. This sense of obligation is considered by many researchers as universal across cultures (Tinsley, 2001). A negotiator may use this principle by making a concession, but also by asking for something in return (i.e., the "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" tactic). Finally, the last tactic of the Table of Ten, *Rational persuasion*, aims at behavioral change through a change of attitude. By means of a logical argument, the negotiator tries to convince the perpetrator that his or her request is reasonable and in accordance with joint goals (Eagly & Chaiken, 1984). This tactic was recognized by Aristotle as "logos", one of the most influential forms of persuasion (Aristotle, trans 1954).

With this approach, because reasoning and arguing are central elements, the negotiator can make use of "the principle of commitment and consistency" (Cialdini, 2001). This principle refers to the need to bring our thought or behavior in line with our earlier behavior, attitude, or decision, especially when the early behavior is witnessed by others. An individual is more likely to accept a particular line of argument if to do so would be consistent with what he or she had previously said and done. The following dialogue between a police negotiator and a perpetrator labels the different communicative statements of the police negotiator in terms of influence tactics.

Example of Negotiation Interaction: Influence Tactics

Speaker	Message	Influence Tactic
Police negotiator	Marco speaking.	
Perpetrator	Romeo here.	
Police negotiator	Romeo, how are you doing?	*Being kind*
Perpetrator	Do you have the 100,000 in cash ready?	
Police negotiator	I am working on it.	*Imposing an restriction*
Perpetrator	Don’t fuck with me!	
Police negotiator	No, I’m not. But it is quite an amount of money and I have to make sure that people do not react suspiciously.	*Rational persuasion*
Perpetrator	Just 100,000 right away.	
Police Negotiator	I’ll do my best. Did I ever let you down before?	*Being credible*
Perpetrator	No, but …	
Police Negotiator	I would like to talk to Cindy when I have the money.	*Exchanging*
Perpetrator	That’s ok	
Police Negotiator	Is she ok? Please take good care of her.	*Emotional appeal*
Perpetrator	Yes.	
Police Negotiator	Thanks. You and I, we are doing great.	*Being equal*

To examine the extent to which police negotiators make use of the different influence tactics, and the extent to which the tactics might be considered effective in the various contexts encountered by the police, the next sections draws on findings from ongoing analysis of 35 hostage incidents (Giebels & Noelanders, 2004; Giebels, Noelanders, & Vervaeke, 2005; Giebels & Taylor, 2006, 2007). All of the incidents were conducted by phone and recorded or transcribed, and they all took place over the past ten years in either the Netherlands or Belgium. All police negotiators and perpetrators were male. In the following sections, we review the results of these studies in combination with findings from previous research.

Use of Influence Tactics

The Dutch-Belgian research project showed that as much as 70 % of the messages that police negotiators convey in crisis negotiations can be characterized as influence tactics (Giebels & Noelanders, 2004). Figure 1 presents the frequency of tactic use for the Table of Ten as a function of three types of incidents: sieges, kidnaps, and extortion attempts. Overall, approximately half of the influence tactics could be labeled as relational strategies and the other half as content strategies. As can be seen from Figure 1, the frequency with which negotiators use each of the ten influence tactics differs considerably. Regardless of the type of incident, *Being kind* is the most frequently used influence tactic. This is perhaps not surprising, since *Being kind* is at the centre of efforts to use empathic and attentive active listening (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, & Romano, 2005). It is also consistent with the finding that nearly 80% of all hostage situations are "relationship-driven" (Van Hasselt, Flood, Romano, Vecchi, de Fabrique, & Dalfonzo, 2005). In contrast, other tactics such as *Intimidation* are used sparingly in sieges but more frequently in the interactions of extortion incidents. These negotiations are usually about tangible issues and therefore seem to resemble more daily, businesslike negotiations, in which threats are usually considered a central strategy (cf. Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2003).

It is interesting to note at this point that the pattern of tactic use identified in Figure 1 is also found in research with Dutch and Belgian students (asking them to indicate which strategies they consider effective in crisis situations, Giebels, 2002) and in analyses of influence tactics of Dutch police detectives encountering suspects in police interviews (Beune, Giebels, & Sanders, 2007). While the variation in tactic use might have resulted from the fact that negotiators are more comfortable using some tactics than others, it is also likely to be a reflection of the extent to which negotiators perceive the tactics as useful to the interaction in which they were involved. This raises an important point: influence tactics vary in their appropriateness and effectiveness according to the circumstances and timing of their use. This notion is well known at the strategic level (Dolnik, 2003; Donohue & Taylor, 2003). For example, phase models of crisis negotiation prescribe a series of changes in the focus of dialogue over time. According to these models, the changes represent the most efficient way of moving a crisis negotiation toward a successful resolution (Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufmann, & Smith, 1991; Holmes, 1992). However, alongside its importance to strategic decisions, the importance of specific circumstances is applicable to our understanding of tactical aspects of crises. Indeed, some of our recent research has shown that the effectiveness of influence tactics is dependent on both the crisis negotiation context and the cultural background of the perpetrator. In the next section, we discuss how the effectiveness of influence tactics has been found to vary across the circumstances of the crisis.

Effectiveness of Influence Tactics across Incident Type, Time Period, and Cultures

While an extensive range of influence tactics are documented in the literature, there are surprisingly few studies into their relative effectiveness in different contexts. This means that the choice of a tactic is primarily based on experience and is taken rather intuitively. To support the knowledge learned through experience, we have conducted a series of detailed analyses on the Dutch-Belgium data set that examine both simple cue-response contingencies (Giebels & Noelanders, 2004) and more sophisticated behavioral interrelationships using Taylor’s proximity coefficient (Giebels & Taylor, 2006, 2007; see also Taylor, 2006; Taylor

& Donald, 2007). In the following sections, we review the results of these studies in combination with findings from previous research.

Impact of Type of Incident

An important distinction with regard to crisis situations is between expressive and instrumental crises. In prototypical expressive situations, such as suicide cases and escalated domestic quarrels, the communication is usually intense and emotional, and the interaction may be regarded as synonymous with crisis counseling (Donohue et al., 1991). Typical examples of expressive crises are situations arising from domestic problems or complex suicide attempts. In contrast, instrumental crisis negotiations look much like business transactions since the victim or hostage is used as leverage by the perpetrators. Typical examples of instrumental crises are kidnappings aimed at obtaining money, and extortions such as the threat of product contamination (the threat of poisoning retail products and endangering the lives of innocent customers). In Europe, expressive crises represent approximately 60 percent of the incidents that the police encounter (Giebels, 1999). However, the number of instrumentally orientated negotiation situations is increasing in both Europe and around the world (see Giebels, 1999). In the same way that instrumental and expressive crises are associated with different contextual characteristics, so the interactions that occur during these crises are most influenced by different kind of influence tactics. In comparison to expressive incidents, our analyses show that instrumental incidents are characterized by greater symmetry in the behavior of the negotiator and the perpetrator (Giebels & Noelanders, 2004). This particularly applies to the strategies of *Rational persuasion* and *Exchanging* (Giebels & Taylor, 2006, 2007). As such, these negotiations are similar to many day-to-day, businesslike negotiations (e.g., Giebels, De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 2000; Giebels et al., 2003).

In contrast, perceived relationship difficulties and resentments (e.g., abandonment, rejection) appear to serve as precipitants to a majority of expressive critical incidents (Van Hasselt et al., 2005). For example, Harvey-Craig, Fisher, and Simpson (1997) found that correlates of expressive prison incidents (e.g., those involving suicide threats) were not substantive demands or persuasive discussion, but physical and verbal aggression, and demands to speak with their family. These behaviors are both arguably focused on relational issues, the establishment of relational dominance, and a desire to have contact with a significant other. Consequently, influence tactics that serve to mitigate the aggravating relational factors become primary to negotiation strategy. These tactics, our research suggests, include *Being kind* (i.e., showing sympathy, listening), making an *Emotional appeal* (i.e., asking attention for the victims), and *Legitimizing* (i.e., referring to the external context; Giebels & Noelanders, 2004).

Finally, some research suggests that expressive situations contain more integrative potential than instrumental situations, which are often win-lose in nature (Giebels & Taylor, 2007). That is, while tangible resources are usually the main issue at the table in instrumental negotiations, the co-occurrence of instrumental, social and relational issues in more expressive crisis situations usually provides opportunities to integrate the interests of the parties involved.

Impact of Negotiation Phase

Most phase models of negotiation distinguish between three phases (Douglas, 1957, 1962; Holmes, 1992; Putnam, Wilson & Turner, 1990): the initial crisis phase, the problem solving phase and the ending phase. Influence tactics can be used throughout the three phases, but they are most central to the problem solving phase (cf. Giebels & Noelanders, 2004). The *first phase* is characterized by acute crisis that is dominated by strong competitive behavior, particularly from the side of the perpetrator (Donohue et al., 1991). Police responses that convey a willingness to listen by *Being kind* and a desire to build report by *Being equal* (Giebels & Noelanders, 2004) usually prove to be effective in this first stage. Consequently, the interaction patterns are also more asymmetrical in nature.

In the *second phase,* where emotional aspects of the crisis have diminished, negotiations tend to involve less competition and become more dominated by reciprocal behaviour (Giebels & Taylor, 2006). For expressive situations, in particular, we found that the focus of negotiators' attention shifts from their own demands to areas of potential agreement, thereby allowing negotiators to occupy themselves with problem solving. Conversely, for instrumental incidents, this phase is more centered around distributive negotiation behaviors, such as *Rational persuasion* and *Intimidation* (Giebels & Taylor, 2007; see also, Adair & Brett, 2004). Also interesting is the finding that, compared to the first phase, the tactic *Being kind* is more immediately followed by perpetrator's use of *Intimidation*. While being kind may be important for relationship building in the first stages of an incident, later use may be regarded as more inappropriate and may interfere with the task related nature of the interaction.

In the third and final phase of negotiation, parties' standpoints come closer together and they occupy themselves with the wording of the agreement and its implementation. This dynamic is most evident in the expressive incidents. Moreover, these efforts often occur within a context of the perpetrator becoming increasingly anxious and fearful, since he or she perceives themselves as more vulnerable with the release of the hostages and their eventual surrender. This makes the third phase a critical period for managing both emotionality and substantive issues, and relational and content based influence tactics both play a role in bring the incident to a successful conclusion.

Impact of Cultural Background

Among the factors that shape crisis negotiations, and one that is becoming increasingly prevalent in applied settings, is the cultural difference between the parties. Police forces in the US and Europe have reported a significant growth in the cultural diversity of perpetrators, particularly within kidnappings and extortions (Giebels & Noelanders, 2004; Ostermann, 2002; Taylor & Donohue, 2006). Such a trend reasserts the need for scholars to understand intercultural aspects of negotiation. Culture is often defined as the characteristic profile of a society with respect to its values, norms, and institutions (Lytle, Brett, Barsness, Tinsley, & Janssens, 1995). It is an important determinant of people's attitudes, self-construal, and behavior, and hence their strategic choices in conflict situations (cf. Pruitt & Kim, 2004). More specifically, and based on Hall's (1976) distinction between low- and high-context cultures, we will distinguish between negotiations with perpetrators from low-context cultures and high-context cultures. Most individualistic Western societies, especially in Northern Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world, can be considered low-context cultures, while most collectivistic Non-Western societies are considered high-context cultures (cf. Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988; see also Hofstede, 2001, p. 212).

An important assumption that is characteristic of low-context communication is what Grice (1975; see also Gudykunst & Matsumoto, 1996) labeled the quality maxim: one should state only that which is believed to be true with sufficient evidence. This maxim implies that low-context communication is typically centered around logic and rationality compared to high-context communication (cf. Adair & Brett, 2004). This implication is consistent with research in a number of areas. For example, Ting-Toomey's work on cross-cultural communication (e.g., Ting-Toomey, 1988) suggests that confronting the other party with rational arguments and factual evidence is more central to American than to Chinese conflict environments (see also, Fu & Yukl, 2000). Our recent analysis of 25 instrumental crisis negotiations with high and low-context perpetrators (Giebels & Taylor, 2007) shows that low context perpetrators are found to be more likely to use *Rational persuasion*, and to be more likely to reciprocate persuasive arguments of the police negotiator. This relative willingness to engage in rational debate was particularly prevalent for low-context perpetrators during the second half of the negotiation, when the crisis has diminished and more normative interaction had begun to take shape.

Interestingly, we also found significant differences in the immediacy with which negotiators reciprocated *Intimidation*. Although perpetrators form low-context cultures used more intimidation tactics, perpetrators from high-context cultures reciprocated *Intimidation* significantly more often than negotiators from low-context cultures. An explanation for this finding is that intimidation refers to a confrontational and assertive way of handling conflict which is consistent with low-context communication, and considered more inappropriate in high-context cultures (Fu & Yukl, 2000). Consequently, high-context negotiators not only use *Intimidation* to a lesser extent, but they are also more likely to "punish" police negotiators who use them with counter-intimidation, particularly because crisis negotiation centre on issues of "who is in charge" (Donohue & Roberto, 1993), and high-context negotiators may be more concerned with establishing dominance (Adair & Brett, 2004). This process may be reinforced by the confrontational nature of *Intimidation*, which draws attention to the need to preserve face, something that is considered more important within high-context rather than low-context cultures (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001).

Communicative Dynamics and Efficiency of Influence Tactics

A question of particular interest to negotiators who wish to use influence tactics in practice is: what tactic(s) is likely to bring about capitulation? This is, of course, a largely unanswerable question, since success at any one time depends on a negotiator's goals and the perpetrator with whom he or she is dealing. However, one possible measure of utility is the extent to which different influence tactics were successful at eliciting compromise behavior from the perpetrator. This measure recognizes that an important goal for the police negotiator is to turn the negotiation into a more normative interaction characterized by mutual concession making. It is also consistent with research examining the behavioral correlates of successful win-lose negotiations (De Dreu, 1995; Hornstein, 1965; Michener, Vaske, Shleifer, Plazewski, & Chapman, 1975). The decision to focus on the occurrence of compromising behavior, rather than overall negotiation outcome, is consistent with our focus on cue-response dynamics. However, importantly, the use of an immediate measure of efficiency has value beyond research, providing a negotiator with a way of obtaining more tangible feedback on progress beyond more macro judgments of success.

In our analyses, low-context negotiators were found to be more likely to respond to *Rational persuasion* in a compromising way (Giebels & Taylor, 2007). Interestingly, the effect on compromising behavior occurred irrespective of the negotiation phase. Thus, it seems sufficient to use arguments to elicit cooperation, regardless of whether the other party is able to fully process or react to them. The reason for this may be that logic and deductive thinking generally highly valued in low context cultures (Gelfand & Dyer, 2000). It may also be seen as an indirect way of showing respect (e.g., "you're an intelligent person, so I want to walk you though my thinking on this topic").

As well as differences in the response to *Rational persuasion*, high- and low-context negotiators also show a difference in their willingness to respond by cooperation following police negotiator *Intimidation*. Specifically, *Intimidation* was found to be more effective at eliciting information sharing in low-context cultures compared to high-context cultures. This is particularly true during early stages of the negotiation. This finding is in line with our previous discussion suggesting *Intimidation* is more consistent with low-context communication. Thus, our research suggests that both *Rational persuasion* and *Intimidation* seem to be more effective in negotiations with perpetrators from low- rather than high-context cultures. There is also some research and theory suggesting that affective influence tactics, such as an *Emotional appeal*, are likely to be more effective in negotiations with high-context perpetrators (cf. Adair & Brett, 2004).

Conclusions: Practical use of the Table of Ten

The Table of Ten provides a framework for thinking about the ways in which negotiation goals may be presented in a convincing way. In our work, it is providing a basis for constructing research into influence tactics and their effectiveness in helping negotiators achieve their goals at different times and in different contexts. In the work of police negotiators, the framework is providing a systematic way of weighing up different approaches to influence at both a planning and delivery stage. Specifically, the framework is useful in at least two ways. First, in a general sense, the Table of Ten has reportedly helped police negotiators in their efforts to diversify their use of influence tactics, and facilitated their efforts to switch between different tactics to suit the goal and conditions at hand. This may be especially true during periods of interaction when negotiators are seeking to make sense of the situation and break through undesirable interaction patterns (Ormerod, Barrett, & Taylor, in press). The Table of Ten provides a way of monitoring negotiators use of the available repertoire of influence tactics. If they have inadvertently focused their messages around content-focused persuasion, then this becomes clear in the monitoring process and the negotiators can consider whether or not it is worth switching to some of the relational focus influence tactics, such as Being equal and Being kind. Moreover, by keeping a log of a perpetrator's responses to different influence tactics (either mentally or physically using a chart), negotiators are able to develop a useful portrait of the perpetrator's responses to different attempts at influence.

Second, the Table of Ten framework may help negotiators make a more conscious selection of influence tactic based on what is known about the type of incident, the incident phase, and the cultural background of the perpetrator. By associating research findings with different tactics in the framework, police negotiators are able to bring to their strategies a clear understanding of the complex cue-response relationships that have been identified in the influence literature. For example, one important message from our research is that use of Rational persuasion and Intimidation is likely to be more effective in negotiations with perpetrators from low-context, rather than high-context, cultures. Thus, when negotiating with a perpetrator from a high-context culture, police negotiators might consider making less use of rational persuasion and more use of affective influence tactics, such as Emotional appeals. Our research to date suggests that this approach is likely to receive a more positive response from the high-context perpetrator.

It is important to view the Table of Ten not as an attempt to teach experienced negotiators something that they already know. Rather, the Table is designed to act as a reference point that facilitates recall and implementation of influence tactics at stressful, time critical moments. Indeed, the influence tactics identified in the Table of Ten are applicable to other situations that deviate from normative, good-faith interactions. Within daily police practice, one example of where the Table of Ten may play a role is in police interviews. In line with crisis negotiations, these situations are also often characterized by opposing interests and low mutual trust. The police are regularly faced with an aggressive, distrustful interviewee and the stakes of the interview can create an uncomfortable tension. In such instances, as in the crisis negotiation context, having available a knowledge of proven tactics for presenting messages effectively can bring about the confidence and interaction style needed to achieve a successful conclusion.

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Table 1: The Table of Ten influence tactics

Tactic	Underlying principle	Description of behavior
Being kind	Sympathy	All friendly, helpful behavior
Being equal	Similarity	Statements aimed at something the parties have in common
Being credible	Authority	Behavior showing expertise or proving you are reliable
Emotional appeal	Self-image	Playing upon the emotions of the other
Intimidation	Deterrence / fear	Threatening with punishment or accusing the other personally
Imposing a restriction	Scarcity	Delay behavior or making something available in a limited way
Direct pressure	Power of repetition	Exerting pressure on the other in a neutral manner by being firm
Legitimizing	Legitimacy	Referring to what has been agreed upon in society or with others
Exchanging	Reciprocity	Give-and-take behavior
Rational persuasion	Cognitive consistency	Use persuasive arguments and logic